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NOTES
Constitutional Law: State Campaign Contribution Limits:
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: An Abridg-
ment of Freedom in the Name of Democracy
L Introduction
Americans contribute hundreds of millions of dollars every year to support and
oppose candidates for public office, and to advocate or fight against issues close to
their hearts. Contributors speak their minds through donations to candidate
campaign organizations, political parties, and issue advocacy groups. Each election
cycle, candidates raise and spend more and more money. Congressional candidates
raised an astounding $4 billion over the last ten years.' The Democratic Congres-
sional Campaign Committee raised $25 million in soft money2 between January 1,
1999, and March 31, 2000 - four times the $6 million the committee raised in the
same amount of time in 1997 and 1998.2 Political action committees raised a
whopping $430.6 million between January 1, 1999, and June 30, 2000 - up 20%
over the same eighteen-month period during the 1997-98 election cycle.4
Despite the significant citizen participation demonstrated by these contributions,
not everyone believes the raising of large sums of money is conducive to a well-run
democracy. In fact, many campaign finance reformers bemoan political
contributions as potentially corrupting influences on candidates and elections!
I. Press Release, FEC Report on Congressional Financial Activity for 2000 -Surpasses $1 Billion
Mark (May 15, 2001), available at http'/www.fecwebl.fec.gov/press/051501congfinact/
051501congfinact.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2001). Congressional candidates raised a record-setting
$1.047 billion for the 1999-2000 election cycle, up 34% from the 1997-98 cycle. Id. In contrast, total
receipts for the 1981-82 cycle were only $354.7 million. Id.
2. "Soft money" refers to contributions to political parties from corporations, unions, special interest
groups, and individuals. These funds can be used for basic campaign activities and party building. The
contributions are called soft money because they are not federally regulated like funds contributed
directly to federal candidates, yet they are often used to purchase issue-related advertisements that serve
to assist or deter particular candidates.
One political watchdog group lobbying for campaign finance reform defines soft money as huge
contributions to political parties which are laundered into specific federal campaigns. See COMMON
CAUSE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM CITIZEN AC"ION KIT 4 (2001) (on file with author).
3. See Jonathan D. Salant, FEC to Enforce Limits on Party Spending, Associated Press Newswires,
June 23, 2000, available in Westlaw, AllNews Plus Database. During the same time frame, the National
Republican Congressional Committee raised $27 million, up from $14 million two years earlier. See i.
4. Press Release, 18-Month Summary on Political Action Committees (Sept. 27, 2000), available
at http'J/www.fec.gov/presslpacl8OOtext.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
5. Warren Richey, Testing Time for Campaign Finance, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5,1999,
at I; Press Release, McCain Declares War on Cynicism, Fights to Ban Soft Money from Politics (Oct.
14, 1999) ("[Enormous sums of money ... seize[] the attention of elected officials who then neglect
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Reform crusaders at the state level have been creative in designing their restrictions
on contributions, imposing various forms of contribution limits intended to address
what they consider unique concerns."
On the other hand, free speech advocates "view candidates raising large amounts
of money as a healthy and essential part of the democratic process."7 In their
minds, a contributor's donation to a candidate enhances the candidate's ability to
communicate his message, adding to political debate and fostering the "free
discussion of governmental affairs."' Even the Supreme Court has recognized that
virtually all means of communication require money, from expensive mass media
campaigns to the simple distribution of pamphlets.'
While recent campaign finance reform efforts at the federal level have been
unsuccessful," a majority of states have enacted laws limiting contributions to
candidates for state offices." Some states have tightened their campaign
contribution restrictions by lowering the maximum allowable contribution, 2 while
other states are weighing their options before legislating restrictions."
Even in the midst of the reform environment, an Oklahoma Ethics Commission
task force has recommended higher limits on contributions to candidates for
problems that directly affect the lives of every American. ... ) available at
http:llmccain.senate.gov/cfroct2.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2001).
6. Brief of Amiei Curiae States of Ohio et al. at 4-6, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377 (2000) (No. 98-963). In reality, the concerns addressed in the brief are not as unique as the states'
chosen restrictions on campaign contributions, which include blanket dollar-amount restrictions on
individual contributions to candidates, regardless of the office sought; varying limits based on the office
sought; limits tied to election cycles or calendar years; restrictions on contributions from government
employees; bans on anonymous campaign contributions; and restrictions on contributions from
corporations, unions, PACs, and national political parties. See id. at 5; see also Jacqueline Soteropoulos,
Campaign Finance Law Being Tested, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 4, 1999, at 1.
7. See Richey, supra note 5, at 1; see also Chris Casteel, Law Expert Wants to Ban Finance Limits,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 25, 1999, at I (quoting Cleta Mitchell, a former Oklahoma legislator and
campaign finance expert, as saying, "I think they should get rid of all the regulations.").
8. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
10. Alison Mitchell, Vote on Campaign Finances Is Blocked by Senate G.O.P. for Fourth Year in
a Row, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at AI (reporting Senate majority leader Trent Lott declared McCain-
Feingold bill "dead for the year"). Since this note was written, the Senate passed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 107th Congress - 1st Session (2001), at
http:llwww.senate.govllegislative/voteO711/vote.00064.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2001) (showing S.27
passed April 2, 2001, by a 59-41 vote). The House has not yet been able to push a campaign finance
reform bill through, although it appears supporters of the Shays-Meehan bill may circumvent the usual
committee process with a discharge petition to get the bill to the House floor for a vote after the August
2001 recess. See J.P. Cassidy, Campaign Bill Petition Nears Critical Mass, HILL, Aug. 8, 2001, at 1.
11. Fed. Election Comm'n, Contribution and Solicitation Limitations (breakdown of state
contribution and solicitation limits), at http'//fecwebl.fec.gov/pagescflOOchart2A.htm and
http:lfecwebl.fec.gov/pagesclfOOchart2B.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001); Richey, supra note 5, at 1.
12. Soteropoulos, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that Florida lowered maximum contributions to
$500).
13. Veronica Gonzalez, State Far from Limiting Campaign Funds, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 27,




statewide offices from political parties. 4 The Ethics Commission, however, is not
considering increased limits on contributions from individuals." Oklahoma law
currently restricts individual and family contributions to $5000 per campaign for
candidates for state offices and offices in large municipalities. 6 Candidates for
other local offices may receive a maximum of $1000 from an individual or his own
family. 7 Oklahoma flatly prohibits corporate contributions benefiting political
candidates."
Oklahoma's neighbor, the State of Missouri, has spent the last few years
defending its campaign contribution limits in court. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court
recently upheld Missouri's restrictions on campaign contributions in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC." A candidate for statewide office and one of his
contributors challenged the limits as violative of their First Amendment political
speech and association rights.2' In reviewing Missouri's contribution limits, the
Court relied on the often criticized case of Buckley v. Valeo," which came to the
Court in the wake of Watergate. The Buckley Court reviewed federal legislation
aimed at redesigning the campaign finance system,' and its decision has remained
the touchstone of campaign finance reform case law.'
When it made its decision in the mid-seventies, the Buckley Court could not have
been sure how its ruling would affect our democracy. Now, twenty-five years later,
we witness its consequences, and reformers continue working to plug campaign
finance law loopholes with even more First Amendment restrictions. Unfortunately,
the Shrink Court did not give these consequences an appropriate review and allowed
Missouri to restrict contributors' and candidates' rights in violation of First
Amendment principles.
14. Chuck Ervin, Panel Backs Raising Donation Limit, TuLSA WoRLD, Aug. 12,2000, at All. The
task force recommended a $50,000 maximum party contribution for gubernatorial candidates and a
$25,000 limit for other statewide office candidates. Id. The maximum individual contribution for both
sets of candidates is currently $5000. Ia
15. Id.
16. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 187.1 (Supp. 2000). A candidate for a municipal or county office in a
municipality or county with a population over 250,000 people may accept up to $5000 from a person
or family. Id.
17. Id. The statute actually uses the words "person" and "family." Id. The statutory definition of
person includes an individual, corporation, association, proprietorship, firm, partnership, organization,
committee, and club. Id. § 187. "'Family' means an individual, his or her spouse, if any, and all children
under the age of eighteen years residing in the same household." Id.
18. ld. § 187.2.
19. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (E.D. Mo. 1999), rev'd, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th
Cir. 2000), vacated mem. sub. noam. Nixon v. Mo. Republican Party, 121 S. Ct. 2584 (2001); Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1998), 528 U.S. 377 (2000), remanded to Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2000).
20. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). PAC is the acronym for political action committee.
21. Id. at 382.
22. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. See id. at 6, 7.
24. Research revealed more than 2000 decisions citing Buckley.
25. The First Amendment is meant to vigorously protect free speech. "[It] is the supreme election
20011
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Part II of this note reviews the Buckley Court's decision regarding political
contribution and expenditure limitations. Part H provides a statement of the Shrink
case and an in-depth discussion of the Court's decision. Part IV considers the
consequences our representative democracy has endured as a result of Buckley's
campaign contribution limits. Part V argues that Missouri's contribution restrictions
should have been subjected to real strict scrutiny, and that they should have been
found unconstitutional for the absence of evidence of harm and for being arbitrarily
and overly restrictive. Part VI concludes the note.
I. Background: Buckley v. Valeo
A. The Constitution Allows Restrictions on Contributions to Candidates, but Not on
Expenditures
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed "the most comprehensive reform
legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-
President, and members of Congress."' The Federal Election Campaign Act's (the
Act) provisions included limits on individual" and political committeen contribu-
tions to candidates, and limits on campaign and independent expenditures.' The
plaintiffs"' argued that the Act's limitations placed grossly unconstitutional
restraints on political speech and association,"' areas the Court. had recognized as
the most deserving of First Amendment protection." Nevertheless, the Buckley
Court upheld contribution limits in the Act (including a $1000 per election limit on
law of the land, and stands as the preeminent safeguard of our republican democracy." James Bopp, Jr.,
All Contribution Limits Are Not Created Equal: New Hope in the Political Speech Wars, 49 CATH. U.
L. ReV. 11, 13 (1999). As repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment's primary
purpose is to protect political speech, Shrink, 528 U.S. at 409 (Thomas, J., dissenting), because political
speech "is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). "The free exchange of ideas provides special vitality to the process traditionally
at the heart of American constitutional democracy - the political campaign." Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U,S. 45, 53 (1982). In fact, "the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15. Not only is
discussion of ideas important, but the debate on the qualifications of candidates is also integral to the
operation of our government. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995). As the
Supreme Court proclaimed, "In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 13 (prohibiting individuals from contributing more than $1000 to any single candidate for
an election campaign and more than a total of $25,000 in a single year).
28. Id. at 35 (prohibiting political committees from contributing more than $5000 to any candidate
with respect to any election for federal office).
29. Id. at 39-59.
30. Plaintiffs included a presidential candidate, a United States Senator who was also a candidate
for re-election, a potential contributor, political parties, and private political organizations. 1d. at 7-8.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 14, 15. "'iThere is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. . . . of course includ[ing]




individual contributions to candidates), while striking down expenditure limits in the
Act?
3
The Court considered the limits on individual contributions as merely "marginal
restriction[s]. '
The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the
size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor's support for the candidate?
The Court also found it important that the "transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."' Further,
the Court reasoned that contribution limits restricted only one means of associating
with a candidate, and left contributors the opportunity to support candidates through
other associations?7 Therefore, candidates and the associations that supported them
could still "aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy.38 In
addition to contributing money, candidate advocates could also provide substantial
support by volunteering their services. 9
B. Contribution Limits Prevent Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
The basic constitutional freedom of association has close ties to the freedom of
speech." Because these rights lie at the foundation of our free society, infringe-
ment upon them is subject to the "closest scrutiny."'" Nevertheless, the Buckley
Court found that the Act's contribution limits were justified under the "rigorous
standard of review established by [its] prior decisions."42
Under this strict standard of review, the government had to first demonstrate a
"sufficiently important interest" to justify limiting the freedoms of speech and
association. 3 The Court" found that Congress's primary interest was to prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption resulting from "large contributions.""
The Court spoke of actual corruption in terms of large contributions given in
exchange for political quid pro quo.!5 The Court considered the impact of
33. ld. at 58-59.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 21. The Court further explained, "A limitation on the amount of money a person may give
to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political com-
munication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not
in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Id.
36. id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. d.
39. Id. at 28.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. Quid pro quo is Latin for "something for something." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (7th
2001]
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perceived corruption to be nearly as dangerous as actual corruption,' reasoning
that "Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence 'is also critical.., if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."'47 In analyzing the
sufficiency of Congress's interest, the Buckley Court accepted the lower court's
discussion of evidence regarding "the deeply disturbing examples" of corruption that
surfaced after the 1972 election." According to the Court, these examples
demonstrated that the problem was not illusory.'
In the second step of its review, the Court determined whether the limitation on
contributions had been "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms."'  The Court rejected appellants' argument that bribery
laws, in combination with narrowly drawn disclosure requirements, would provide
a less restrictive means of addressing Congress's interests."' The Court approved
the additional restriction of contribution limits because corruption and the
appearance of corruption are "inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial
contributions."'
The Court found that the Act's $1000 contribution limitation dealt precisely with
the problem of large contributions. 3 The Court found it significant that the limits
did not materially undermine "the potential for robust and effective discussion of
candidates and campaign issues" by individuals, associations, the press, candidates,
or political parties.' The Court refused to invalidate the $1000 restriction as
unrealistically low to effectuate corruption or its appearance." Nor would the
Court take a scalpel to Congress's determination of an appropriate limit.' Instead,
the Court found that distinctions in the degree of limitation are significant only
when they "amount to differences in kind."'
The Act's contribution limits overcame other challenges as well. The Court did
not find the limitations unconstitutionally broad, reasoning that most large
contributors do not seek to corrupt a candidate." Nor did the Court accept the
ed. 1999). It is a thing that is exchanged for another thing of more or less equal value, a substitute. Id.
Examples of political quid pro quos in exchange for contributions are political appointments and
favorable legislative action.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id
48. Id. at 27. Here, the Court was referencing activities taking place during the Watergate era, which
Part V.B of this note discusses.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 25.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id.
57. id.




proposition that the limits invidiously discriminated in favor of incumbents, and
against challengers and minor-party candidates. 9
C. Expenditure Restrictions Burden First Amendment Expression
On the other hand, the Court found that "[a] restriction on the amount of money
a person or group can spend on political communication .. reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.' Such expenditure limitations,
in contrast with contribution limitations, are direct and "substantial rather than
merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech."'"
The Court found that the independent expenditure ceiling heavily burdened core
First Amendment expression without serving any substantial government interest."
The Court observed:
[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure
to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as quid pro quo for improper commitments for the candidate.'
Candidates spending their personal funds to advocate their elections to office
could not be restricted because the concern about undue influence from outside
interests would not exist." Additionally, the Court flatly rejected the government's
interest in equalizing the varied voices of candidates' political speech in order to
equalize influence over electoral outcomes.' According to the Court, the framers
designed the First Amendment to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"; therefore, it
is improper to calibrate the strength of its protection according to a candidate's
financial status.'
59. Id. at 30-35.
60. Ud. at 19 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 19, 59.
62. Id. at 47-48.
63. Id. at 47.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 48-49. "Mhe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id.
Surprisingly, this unacceptable interest is being touted by Sen. John McCain to gain citizen support for
federal campaign finance reform legislation. Ryan Chittum, CampaigningforRefonn: McCain Calls OU
to Action, OKLA. DAILY (University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.), Feb. 26, 2001, available at http.//
www.oudaily.com.
66. Id. at 49. The Court found that the voting rights cases did not support abridging the rights of
some to enhance the relative voice of others. Id. at 49 n.55 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); and
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970)). "Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate, not
a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues." I&a
20011
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The Court also found that candidates often raise various amounts of money based
on the size and intensity of their support6 The fact that one candidate spends
more money than his opponent does not, on its face, raise an inference of
impropriety.0 In fact, equalizing candidate expenditures could penalize a neophyte
candidate with low name recognition and minimal public awareness of his political
convictions at the outset of the campaign.' Furthermore, the Court rejected the
apparent intended interest of easing the escalating costs of political campaigns."
I1. Statement of the Case: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
A. The Missouri Statute
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,7' the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
a Missouri statute that limits contributions to candidates for state office." The
legislature originally enacted the statute in 1994, but the statute was superseded by
a ballot initiative that restricted contributions to as low as $100." The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the limits in the Missouri initiative were
unconstitutionally low, reasoning that the State did not provide evidence to justify
the limits or demonstrate that the limits were narrowly tailored to prevent real
corruption or the appearance of corruption.7' Thus, the legislature's previously
superseded statute took effect, limiting contributions to candidates for various state
offices to amounts ranging from $250 to $1000."
The statute provides for inflationary adjustments, which at the time that Shrink
Missouri Government PAC and Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican
nomination for State Auditor, sought to enjoin the statute, allowed for a maximum
contribution of $1075 to a candidate for statewide office." Shrink PAC had
already given two contributions totaling $1075 to Fredman's campaign in 1997 and
1998." The PAC claimed it would contribute more if it did not have to comply
with the limits.' Fredman claimed the $1075 limit prevented him from running an
effective campaign." Shrink PAC and Fredman both believed that the statute
violated their constitutional rights of free speech and free association.' They also
argued that Missouri's contribution limits should have been based on the $1000 limit
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 57.
70. Id.
71. 528 U.S. 377.
72, Id.
73. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 634 n. I (8th Cir. 1995).
74. Id. at 641-43.
75. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 382.
76. Id. at 382-83. The current statute can be found at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West Supp.
2000).







set in Buckley in 1976 and adjusted for inflation."' Concerned that suspicions of
corruption might diminish confidence in the integrity of government, the district
court sustained the statute; however, the Eighth Circuit enjoined enforcement and
reversed the lower court.' The court of appeals found that Missouri, in support of
its interest in abridging First Amendment freedoms, did not present sufficient
evidence to show that corruption or the appearance of corruption was a problem in
the state." In addition, the court found that the specific limit amounts were overly
restrictive.'
B. Court Holds That Buckley Allows States to Restrict Contributions
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Buckley decision fully applied to the
Missouri statute and that the state's contribution limits need not be tied to the dollar
limits accepted in Buckley.' While recognizing that Buckley did not set a precise
standard of scrutiny, the Court reiterated Buckley's general discussion of "the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." ' However, the Court also
acknowledged that decisions after Buckley made it clear that contribution limits
would be more readily accepted than spending limitsY In the end, the Shrink
Court declared that a contribution limit involving "significant interference" with
associational rights could survive if the government demonstrated that the regulation
was "closely drawn" to meet a "sufficiently important interest."'"
Using language from Buckley, the Shrink Court found that limiting a contributor's
"symbolic act" of giving money places only a marginal restraint on political
communication." Political association and communication remain "significantly
unimpaired" by contribution limits because a contributor remains "free to become
a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's
efforts on behalf of candidates." ' The Shrink Court also made it clear that, in
addition to preventing actual corruption, preventing the appearance of corruption
also serves as a sufficiently important state interest."
81. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1998). When adjusted for
inflation according to the Consumer Price Index, Missouri's $1075 limit in 1998 was the equivalent of
only $378 in 1976. Id.
82. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 383.
83. Id. at 384.
84. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 382.
86. Id. at 386.
87. Id. at 387. "[Rlestrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions
on independent spending." Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 259-60 (1986)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 386.
90. Id. at 387.
91. Id. at 390 ("Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that
large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.").
20011
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Shrink PAC and Fredman did not challenge the legitimacy of Missouri's interest
in eradicating the appearance of corruption' However, they did charge that the
State lacked the necessary evidence to "demonstrate that the recited harms [were]
real, not merely conjectural."' 3 The Shrink Court rejected the respondents' call for
more sufficient evidence, distinguishing a case cited by respondents requiring
significant evidence of corruption.9 The Court held, "We have never accepted
mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden .... In any event,
this case does not present a close call requiring further definition of whatever the
State's evidentiary obligation may be.""
Based on nearly twenty-five years of inflation, the respondents urged the Court
to consider Missouri's contribution limits as different in kind from the limits in
Buckley.' The Shrink Court found that Missouri's limits were adequately tailored
to serve the State's purposes. The limits did not have any dramatically adverse
effect on the funding of political campaigns because candidates for state offices had
been able to "amass impressive campaign war chests" in order to "run effective
campaigns." 7  According to the Court, Missouri's restrictions were not so
outrageous that they silenced candidates or caused political association to become
inconsequential."
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, had one point to make: "Money is
property; it is not speech."' As property, political contributions are entitled to
constitutional protections, but not as much protection as the right to speak one's
mind." Justice Breyer's concurrence"0 ' stated that contributions deserve First
Amendment protection because they enable speech." 2 He asserted that the Buckley
Court actually applied a balancing test that would weigh the constitutionally
protected interests of free speech and association against the constitutionally
protected interest of upholding the integrity of the electoral process."2 Justice
Breyer found that the presumption against constitutionality that comes with strict
92. Id.
93. Id. at 392 (internal quotations omitted). The respondents' brief quoted United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,475 (1995), which in turn quoted Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). Id.
94. Id. The Court distinguished Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), by noting that it dealt with independent expenditures by
political parties, not contributions to candidate campaigns. Id. Without coordination between a candidate
and a contributor, there is less concern about corruption. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 396.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 397.
99. Id. at 398.
100. Id.
101. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's concurring opinion. Id.
102. Id. at 400.




scrutiny is misapplied when such important interests are at odds.'"' In the end,
however, his balancing scales tipped in deference to the Missouri legislature."5
Justice Kennedy's dissent spoke of the Court's "duty to face up to adverse,
unintended consequences flowing" from Buckley."0 ' Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, called for Buckley to be overruled.'"7 He claimed that the Court's
ruling abandoned the principle that political speech is the primary object of First
Amendment protection."0'
IV. The First Amendment's Passionate Protection of Political Speech
and Association Required the Court to Consider the Consequences
of Contribution Limits
The Buckley Court expended considerable effort addressing the strength of the
First Amendment's historical protection of political speech and association.'"'
Unfortunately, the Buckley Court then proceeded to minimize those freedoms by
pronouncing that they are not disabled by contribution limits."0 The Shrink Court,
in contrast, gave these constitutional guarantees little ink and instead went right to
work explaining why contribution limits negligibly impair political communication
and association."'
The Shrink Court abandoned the First Amendment's "foundational principles""1
2
and avoided discussion of the deficiencies in its Buckley decision. Given the First
Amendment's inherent importance to the functioning of our democracy, the Shrink
Court should have placed the consequences of Buckley's contribution limits under
thorough review". and recognized the real restrictions these limits place on First
Amendment freedoms. Among these consequences are five areas that Professor
Bradley A. Smith"4 has identified as "undemocratic.""'
First, contribution limits favor incumbents by making it difficult for challengers
to compete on the same level." 6 Incumbents have valuable name recognition,
established campaign organizations, extensive supporter lists, and relationships with
the media." 7 An unknown challenger begins his campaign without these advantag-
es and is further shackled by the inability to raise significant amounts of money
104. Id. at 401-02.
105. Id. at 402-03.
106. Id. at 406.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 408.
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
110. id. at 20-37.
111. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 385-87.
112. Id. at 411 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
335, 342-355 (2000).
114. Assistant Professor, Capital University Law School.
115. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE LJ. 1049, 1071-72 (1996).
116. Id. at 1072.
117. Id. at 1072-74.
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from a small number of dedicated supporters."" In Shrink, one respondent,
Fredman, was a first-time candidate for statewide office who did not have a network
of political contacts or an established base of contributors."' He had to manage
his business while running for office and was unable, under the $1075 limits, to
raise the seed money needed to run an effective campaign."
One unsuccessful congressional candidate, Dr. Demaris Miller, testified at a
Senate hearing about the roadblocks she faced in her campaign against an
entrenched incumbent.' Dr. Miller ran against an incumbent who was often
interviewed by the local press and who appeared regularly on a popular CNBC talk
show." Dr. Miller, in contrast, rarely received equal-time interviews with the
local media and never secured an interview with the talk show." While her
opponent enjoyed an official, taxpayer-funded web site, Dr. Miller's campaign had
to raise money to pay for an informational web site." She dedicated nearly one-
third of her total expenditures to winning her primary, which meant she had about
$310,000 to work with during the general election." Her incumbent opponent ran
unopposed for his party's nomination and spent $534,660 to win the general
election. The incumbent raised much of this amount in previous election cycles."
Another example of the financial advantages enjoyed by incumbents is that of
members of the U.S. House of Representatives seeking re-election and receiving
several times the contributions raised by their opponents.'" More than 90% of
those well-funded incumbents regularly defeat their opponents."n Researchers have
found that an incumbent's advantages have a powerful impact on state elections as
well. In state races, challengers often spend 25% or less of their incumbent
opponent's totals. 9 And similar to federal races, the candidate who spends the
most money almost always wins." When candidates such as Mr. Fredman cannot
118. Id. at 1072-73.
119. Respondents' Brief at 6, Shrink (No. 98-963).
120. Id. Like a plant seed is necessary to begin the production of a plant, seed money is the
campaign financing necessary to fuel initial campaign activities. Candidates expect seed money to help
produce a base of supporters who will contribute the additional funds necessary to run a successful
campaign.
121. Campaign Contribution Limits: Hearing Before the Comm. on Rules and Admin., U. S. Senate,
106th Cong. 31-36 (1999) (prepared statement of Demaris H. Miller) [hereinafter Hearing].
122. Id. at 32.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Id. at 34. Dr. Miller's total expenditures, including in-kind contributions, were $456,695. Id.
126. Id. at 33-34.
127. During 1997 and 1998,436 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives incumbents running for
re-election received $429,885,757. See 1997-98 Financial Activity of All Senate & House Campaigns,
available at http:llwww.fec.gov/presslalsum98.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000). Their 1285 challengers
raised $210,495,003. See id
128. Smith, supra note 115, at 1075; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1401 (1994).
129. JOEL A. THOMPSON & GARY F. MONCRIEF, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGIsLATIVE
ELECTIONS 111 (1998).




even raise a threshold amount of money - or seed money - it is "virtually
impossible for them to compete, let alone win."'3
The second undemocratic consequence of contribution limits is that they increase
the incentives for contributors to seek influence over an official's legislative votes,
while they decrease accountability.' Once a campaign donor has given the
maximum amount to his preferred candidate, he will often give additional money
to issue-oriented organizations that contribute to candidates in an effort to gain
support for the organizations' legislative interests. Thus, contribution limits
encourage candidates searching for additional financial support - because they are
handicapped by contribution restrictions - to move toward those particular
legislative initiatives and away from constituent opinion. Savvy candidates also
know that independent expenditures by issue-oriented organizations can have
significant impacts on public opinion, and ultimately on the outcome of elections.
While eager campaign donors are pigeonholed into financing legislative interests
rather than contributing further toward the election of particular candidates, those
same candidates are moving away from the broad interests of their constituents and
toward the narrower interests of wealthy special interests. It follows then, that the
representative system's democratic value diminishes as it becomes more responsive
to these special interests and less responsive to constituent opinion." Ironically,
campaign finance reformers expect additional contribution restrictions to minimize
the power wielded by issue advocacy groups, which now thrive because reformers
successfully enacted contribution restrictions almost thirty years ago.
Third, contribution limits favor select elites at the expense of isolating individual
citizens from the political process. 3 ' These elites obtain their political influence
through various attributes, such as speaking ability, personality, good looks,
organizational skills, influence over potential volunteers, celebrity, and access to or
control of the popular press." Despite the fact that these modes of influence can
be extremely powerful, they do not encounter the same restrictions as do contribu-
tions of money.'37 For example, a retired public relations executive can volunteer
her professional talents - worth $10,000 in the private sector - to a candidate's
campaign without any restriction. However, under Missouri's contribution
limitations, a contributor could not give the opposing candidate a $10,000
contribution to pay for equivalent services."
131. d. at 113. Fredman's campaign certainly was not one of the campaign war chests of which the
Shrink Court spoke.
132. Smith, supra note 115, at 1075.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1077.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1078.
137. Id.
138. Professor Smith compared a twenty-five-year-old Harvard law student turning down a $15,000
summer law firm job because he wished to volunteer on a campaign and a twenty-five-year-old high
school dropout who owned a successful auto body shop and wished to contribute $15,000 to the
campaign. Id. at 1079-80.
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Fourth, the limits favor wealthy candidates who reach into their own pockets to
fund their campaigns while their less wealthy opponents are forced to raise the
money.'39 This system restricts the number of viable candidates, which, in the end,
limits voter choice."4 Historically, candidates with large constituencies among the
working class have been funded by a small number of wealthy supporters.'4' By
eliminating this source of vital funding, such candidates cannot compete.', This
consequence, as well as the lopsided power of incumbency, results in the financially
deprived candidate spending more time and energy on fundraising. This focus on
fundraising takes away from time spent on the constitutionally significant acts of
communicating political ideas and debating important campaign issues.
Lastly, Professor Smith found that contribution regulations favor sophisticated
special interests over grassroots, citizen-oriented activity."" Contribution limits,
along with other campaign regulations, impose a great burden on political speakers
who lack familiarity with complex laws and the astute organization necessary to
comply with them." The intricate regulations surrounding campaign finance
reform have "the perverse effect of professionalizing politics and distancing the
system from 'ordinary' citizens."'
4 5
Another issue of great concern is that while the costs of campaigning have
skyrocketed, the allowable individual contribution to federal candidates has not
changed in twenty-five years. Television advertising, the best and favored way to
quickly reach targeted audiences, can deplete campaign coffers in less time than it
takes to watch a political advertisement. In 1999, reaching one thousand homes with
a thirty-second spot cost more than five times as much as it did in 1975 - and
households with televisions grew from 69.6 million to 99.4 million in the same time
period." So, not only does it cost considerably more to reach each household, but
there are thirty million more households to reach. Other ordinary campaign costs,
such as polling, commercial production, and postage, have also dramatically
increased.47 While the cost of campaigning for state legislative seats varies widely
by state, one study revealed significant increases above the rate of inflation in
several states.'"
The grueling money chase created by the Buckley decision has compelled some
elected officials to abandon their posts or refuse to seek higher office. Senator Paul
Simon declined to seek re-election because he realized the effort to raise the
139. Id. at 1081.




144. Id. at 1082-83.
145. ld. at 1083. In 1991, the Los Angeles Times found that the second largest group of people who
had violated the Act's contribution limits of $25,000 per contributor were elderly people with little
understanding of campaign laws. Id
146. Hearing, supra note 121, at 56 (attachment to testimony of Karen Sheridan, Executive Vice
President of SMY Media).
147. Id at 52 (prepared testimony of Karen Sheridan, Executive Vice President of SMY Media).




required $10 million would consume one-third of his time during the last two years
of his term in the Senate.'49 Senator Dennis DeConcini grew tired of constantly
"grazing" for money.'" One former senator noted that in order to run a $5 million
campaign, a candidate must raise $50,000 each week for two years or $16,000 each
week for six years, the full length of a Senate term."'
The Missouri statute in Shrink went before the U.S. Supreme Court nearly two-
and-a-half decades after the Buckley decision. This significant time frame should
have given laws on contribution limits an ample opportunity to begin preventing
corruption and the perception of corruption in campaigns; yet, campaign finance
reform aimed at alleviating that same evil was still a cornerstone issue in the 2000
presidential campaigns." If campaign contribution limits were achieving their
goal, the current debate over the perceived need for further restrictions on political
freedoms would be unnecessary.
The ineffectiveness of contribution limits combined with the unintended
consequences they have spawned should have caused the Court to take a fresh look
at the profound effect these limits have on First Amendment freedoms. When
legislation strikes in the sensitive area of First Amendment freedom and the passing
of time demonstrates that the legislation has not realized its intended goal, the Court
should reassess its initial decision and supporting reasoning.' Shrink provided an
appropriate opportunity for the Court to recognize that contribution limits trample
the First Amendment and to eliminate the restrictions altogether.
V. Analysis
A. Real Strict Scrutiny Should Have Been Applied
Buckley's standard of review for contribution limits has been subjected to
numerous interpretations. Writers have characterized it as strict scrutiny," less-
than-strict scrutiny,"' heightened intermediate scrutiny," and amorphous."
The Shrink Court began its discussion of the standard of review for contribution
149. See Hearings, supra note 121, at 88 (exhibit to testimony of former U.S. Sen. Dan Coats,
quoting former U.S. Senators).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19 (prepared testimony of Dan Coats).
152. Editorial, Bush, McCain and Finance Reform, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 21, 2000, at 12 (reporting
then-presidential candidate Gov. George W. Bush's announcement of a campaign finance reform plan);
Zachary Coile, GOP's McCain Gambles on Reform, S.F. EXAMINER, July 8, 1999, at Al (reporting
presidential candidate Sen. John McCain's hope that voters will be attracted to his campaign finance
reform efforts); Gore 2000 Backgrounder - Bradley-Gore Comparison: The Record on Campaign
Finance Reform, U.S. Newswire, Dec. 14, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Database.
153. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405-06 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154. D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurdle for Campaign Finance "Reform,"
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217, 223 (1998).
155. Marshall, supra note 113, at 351.
156. Jane Conrad, Note, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Campaign Contributions,
Symbolic Speech and the Appearance of Corruption, 33 AKRON L. REv. 551, 562 (2000).
157. Paul M. Smith et al., Decision in Shrink Missouri, 18 CoMM. LAW. 22 (2000).
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limits by acquiescing that the Buckley decision did not set a precise standard of
review.'" In narrowing the possibilities, the Court recalled the standards of review
rejected in Buckley. " It then stated that associational rights should receive more
protection than speech rights." Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Thomas, and Scalia
called it a balancing test.6 In the end, the Shrink Court applied what it called
"Buckley's standard of scrutiny,'" 62 which was scrutiny labeled as exacting, but
which was "something... much less" upon application.'63
In light of the widespread confusion in such a sensitive area of freedom, the
Shrink Court should have clarified the application of a strict scrutiny standard of
review for restrictions on contributions. While the Court proclaimed that contribu-
tion limitations bear more heavily on the associational right than on the freedom to
speak, commentators have made strong arguments for equal treatment of the
protected freedoms."' The Shrink opinion did include a footnote that directed
comparison of Buckley's standard of scrutiny with the standards applied in other
First Amendment opinions." Those standards required the "closest scrutiny" and
a "compelling state interest" that could not be achieved through less restrictive
means in order to curtail the freedom to associate.'" When viewed as a whole, the
Shrink Court's various statements regarding the standard of review signal the Court's
belief that these political freedoms deserved strict scrutiny. The Court, however, just
did not seem to actually apply strict scrutiny.
According to the Shrink Court, the contribution limits could only survive if
Missouri demonstrated that the limits were closely drawn to match a sufficiently
important interest. While the prevention of actual corruption seems like a
"constitutionally sufficient justification"'6 7 on the surface, further inquiry brings the
justification into question. Buckley originally spoke of actual corruption in terms of
"large contributions ... given to secure political quid pro quo."'" This definition
158. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 386.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 387.
161. Id at 402-03, 410.
162. Id. at 387.
163. Id. at 421 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. Marshall, supra note 113, at 350-52. Professor Marshall named four reasons the Court drew
an incoherent distinction between contributions and expenditures. First, the Court's distinction was
inconsistent with its own characterization of "contributions and expenditures as core First Amendment
protection." Id. at 350. Second, Buckley ignored the constitutional equivalencies of the two freedoms:
"both express political messages; contributions are essentially a form of indirect expenditures"; and
contributions are acts of political association, just like expenditures are political expression. Id at 350-51.
Third, the Court's conclusion that corruption or its appearance is more likely to exist with direct
donations than from large sums spent on the candidate's behalf is "tenuous at best." Id at 351. Fourth,
the reality of campaigns is that the unlimited ability to spend drives the need for contributions. Id. If
expenditures are protected because money is indispensable to the communication of political ideas, then
the same should apply to contributions, the supply side of expenditures. Id
165. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 387 n.3.
166. Id.





would require large contributions in exchange for "coercive influence on candidates'
positions and ... actions.""' Put another way, "Elected officials are influenced
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusion of money into their campaigns."'tm But then the Buckley
Court supplemented its definition of corruption with more ambiguous terms such as
"improper influence"' 7' and "opportunities for abuse."'" The Shrink Court used
these additional terms to secure a broader meaning of corruption: the "power of
money 'to influence government action' in ways less 'blatant and specific' than
bribery."'" As Justice Thomas pointed out, the Court improperly expanded the
meaning of corruption to include "politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors.""l
The Court's characterization of actual corruption - something less than the
exchange of money for coercive influence on votes or advocacy of political
positions - really reflects the Court's concern over how responsive an elected
official should be to each constituent.7 1 The feared harm is more than the
bartering of public office. It is a concern about politicians straying from the
acceptable boundaries of democratic representation . 76 The influence or power
created from so-called corrupting contributions could be the innocent ability to
obtain an appointment with an official or to secure the official's presence at a
community event. The contribution of money to a candidate because he promises
to work toward the passage of certain legislation is simply supporting the candidate
that the contributor believes will best represent her. Campaign contributions do not
equal guaranteed legislative results in exchange for money." The attention a
candidate gives a contributor is the same kind of disproportionate attention given
to interest groups with large memberships or active grassroots organizations, even
religious groups. The power, or corrupting influence as some would believe, of
these organizations could simply be the ability to mobilize their members for
political purposes. 7'
The Court's view of what activities qualify as corruption strikes at the heart of
conflicting philosophies of democratic representation. The civic republican would
consider responsiveness to constituent preferences a delinquency of the
representative's obligation to use his wise, independent thought regarding the best
interest of the public." On the other hand, the populist would expect her
169. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
170. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat' Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,497 (1985).
171. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
172. Id.
173. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 389.
174. Id. at 424.
175. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 663,
678 (1997).
176. Id. at 679.
177. Id.
178. Id at 680.
179. Id at 681.
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representative to act as a dutiful transmitter of "polling data into policy."'" Neither
of these views, when put into action, is contrary to the law. Therefore, neither
should be vilified as democracy-destroying corruption for the purpose of absconding
First Amendment rights.
Included with the accepted interest of preventing actual corruption is the
prevention of the "appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contribu-
tions.'.'. Not only is the Court's broad brand of actual corruption unacceptable,
but the government's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is a much
too ambiguous justification upon which to allow restriction of political speech and
association. The reality of evil corruption is too far removed from the Court's
"appearance of corruption" scenario to justify restriction of a citizen's First
Amendment rights. The government bases its interest on nothing more than highly
subjective appearances and perceived opportunities that do not accurately represent
the objectives of most contributors' participation in the political process.
The Court concluded that "[d]emocracy works 'only if the people have faith in
those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and
their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and
corruption.""' The very nature of suspicion is nebulous, oftentimes gauged only
by a gut feeling. Suspicion has been defined as a "mental uneasiness" or an
"imagination of something wrong without proof, or on slight evidence."'" By
approving suspicion as a sufficient governmental interest, the Court declared that
whimsical imagination is enough to restrict the most protected area of First
Amendment freedom.
Appearances and impressions are highly subjective because they are based on
individual assessments of information. A state's people may suspect corruption
because they have heard of its existence in the past, possibly in the distant past.
Actual corruption may not have taken place for years, yet politicians trying to move
their approval ratings up the scale can, with the assistance of the sensationalizing
media, induce the citizenry to believe corruption lurks throughout the political
system. In addition, a state's voters may suspect their officials of corruptive
activities because corruption has been reported to take place in other states. Polls
reveal a common public perception that large corporate contributions in a given state
corrupt candidates, when, in reality, the state's laws completely prohibit corporate
contributions.'
Modern American political campaigns are an exercise in creating appearances.
The American polity expects to be spun by slick candidates and entertained with
political dog-and-pony shows. Candidates kiss their spouses in front of millions of
180. Id.
181. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000).
182. Id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961)).
183. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 1189 (9th ed. 1985).
184. James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L.




people"' and serve meals in senior citizen centers to shape their public images.
They stage photo opportunities with children in disadvantaged neighborhoods and
run television ads with subliminal messages." Candidates stretch the truth to
make their opponents appear self-serving or even evil on one issue, then smile and
commend each other on the next issue. The practice is so accepted that political
pundits spend entire television shows and write lengthy editorials on the normalcy
of truth stretching in political campaigns."
The Shrink Court's unbridled expansion of the meaning of actual corruption, and
to an even greater extent, its continued endorsement of the appearance of corruption
as a constitutionally sufficient justification, are substantial reasons for one to
question the preciseness of the Court's scrutiny of campaign contribution limits.
The Court's sui generis "Buckley's standard of scrutiny" allowed the muffling cries
of Missouri's citizens and legislators to penetrate the constitutional shield
surrounding political speech. Real strict scrutiny would not allow the abridgement
of First Amendment freedoms simply because a politician may be responsive to a
constituent who happens to be a campaign donor participating in a democratic
system that requires significant financial contributions. Nor would real strict
scrutiny permit the waning faith of fickle citizens to trample the First Amendment
on the grounds that those citizens believe, with little proof, that corruption may
exist. The Court should not have permitted Missouri to limit contributions without
first subjecting those restrictions to a strict standard of review - a standard under
which the limits should fall.
B. Proof of Harm Should Be Necessary
Despite the implausible inadequacy of the corruption and the appearance of
corruption interest adopted by the Court, the respondents did not challenge it.
However, the respondents did challenge Missouri's assertion that actual corruption
was taking place in the state, or, at least, that corruption was perceived by the state's
citizens to exist." The Eighth Circuit's opinion adopted language from the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union: 9 "When the Government defends a regulation on speech ... it must do
more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.'.. . It must
demonstrate that the recited harms are real .... and that .the regulation will in fact
185. Ed Bark, Gore Wins Laughs on Letterman Show, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 15, 2000,
at 35A. During Al Gore's appearance on The Late Show, David Letterman told the Vice President that
his prolonged kiss of Tipper Gore at the Democratic convention showed America that "I've got a wife
that I'm still crazy about. I'm not gonna be chasi' interns." Id.
186. Frank Bruni, Bush Says Rats Reference inAd Was Unintentional, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,2000,
at A19 (reporting George W. Bush's defense of a television ad attacking Al Gore's plans for health care,
which included an almost undetectable flashing image of the word "rats").
187. See, e.g., Hannity & Cobnes: Which Presidential Candidate Has the Momentum? (Fox News
Network television broadcast, Oct. 12, 2000), LEXIS, News, Transcripts; Marc Sandalow, Mannerly
Debate Masks Cruel Contest, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2000, at A15; R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Credibility
Crisis, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2000, at A18.
188. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 390.
189. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
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alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."''" The Eighth Circuit was
"unwilling to extrapolate" from the federal campaign finance problems cited in
Buckley that Missouri suffered from corruption or a perception of corruption due to
large contributions to state candidates.' '
Missouri offered the affidavit of a state senator who had cochaired the Interim
Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform when the contribution limits were
enacted.' This senator did not provide any evidence that candidates had received
large campaign contributions before Missouri's limits went into effect. Conse-
quently, there could be no evidence of resulting corruption or its appearance.
93
"The senator stated that he and his colleagues believed there was the 'real potential
to buy votes' if the limits were not enacted, and that contributions greater than the
limits 'have the appearance of buying votes."'" The court of appeals could not
decipher whether the senator's statements were his own perceptions or the public
perception, and determined that the affidavit was conclusory and self-serving.""'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not find the statute void for lack of
evidence." The Court stated that the "quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down
with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."''" In Buckley, the
Court found that actual corruption or the perception of corruption were plausible
consequences of large contributions, but did not outline the minimal evidentiary
requirements for proving corruption.'" The Shrink Court did not accept the
respondents' argument that Buckley had been supplemented by National Treasury
or Colorado Republican Federal Campaign commission v. Federal Election
Commission" to require the State to .'demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural."'' The Court found the fact that the Colorado Republican
decision concerned independent expenditure caps significant because the lack of
coordination with the candidate eliminated the assumption of potential corrup-
tion.
The Shrink Court looked to the evidence cited by the lower courts as well as
evidence introduced into the record by respondents.? Unlike the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court found that this information, along with Missouri's ballot vote on
190. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Carver v.
Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1995), which invalidated Missouri's ballot initiative that approved
campaign contribution limits).
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contribution limits, was enough to warrant the Missouri legislature's concerns. 3
In doing so, the Court accepted evidence that not only was inadequate for the
purpose of restricting political speech and association rights, but that also embraced
constitutionally unacceptable government interests.
The district court cited one newspaper editorial that observed a possible
favoritism connection between a bank's $20,000 contribution to the State Treasurer
and that bank's selection as the state's bank some time later.' Unfortunately, the
Shrink Court failed to acknowledge that the editorial proceeded to conclude that the
bank had "won the contest fair and square."' The bank had submitted the lowest
bid in a process subjected to considerable review and had given the state a
discount. Therefore, the editorial proffering was merely a circumstantial
observation of possibility by the media, far from strong proof upon which
reasonable widespread perception of corruption could be based. Another cited article
simply reported contributions of $20,000 and $40,000 to a candidate for State
Auditor.' The article made no claim that the contributors gave the money in
exchange for corrupting influence. Furthermore, while the only accepted interest for
contribution limits concerns corruption, the district court's evidence regarding the
media's coverage of the ballot initiative spoke to the constitutionally insufficient
interests of leveling the playing field and limiting the influence of special
interests.' The Court recklessly proclaimed that the majority vote for the
initiative "certainly attested to the perception" that the limits were necessary to
combat corruption and its appearance.' The cited evidence did not support
Missouri's contention that its citizens were concerned about corruption, but instead
clearly showed that those citizens sought to limit First Amendment rights for
reasons explicitly rejected by the Court!"°
The Shrink Court's less-than-minimal evidentiary requirements send the states an
alarming message: it doesn't matter how weak your evidence supporting the
constitutionally acceptable state interest is when contribution limits become state
law, as long as you offer the argument that you are concerned about corruption or
its appearance when the law is challenged in court. The Buckley Court at least
relied on the court of appeals' discussion of "a number of abuses uncovered after
the 1972 elections" in its opinion."' The nation's concerns over the integrity of the
electoral system were so intense at that time that the appellate court characterized
203. Id. at 393.
204. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
205. Editorial, The Central Issue Is Trust, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6C.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738 n.7.
209. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394 (2000).
210. It is well settled that "voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure
than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation." Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 n.28 (1976).
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it as a time of crisis."' Political impropriety was rampant. Congressional findings
revealed illegal corporate contributions, millions of dollars of coordinated special
interest contributions to President Nixon's campaign, and millions in individual
contributions to Nixon in exchange for guarantees to ambassador posts.21 In
contrast, the State of Missouri offered no such revealing legislative findings. The
Shrink Court should not have reversed the Eighth Circuit without real proof that the
citizens of Missouri were being harmed, or were likely to be harmed, by campaign
contributions beyond the state's legislated limits.
C. Missouri's Limits Are Far from Closely Drawn
As the next step of review, the Court required the regulations to be closely
drawn. The Court found that Missouri's $1075 limit on campaign contributions was
closely drawn to meet the sole constitutionally sufficient justification of preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption. The Court, very confident in its
decision, found that the case did not even present a close call requiring further
definition of Missouri's evidentiary obligation. The Court certainly did not take an
exacting scalpel to the amount of the restrictions; its analysis is more appropriately
characterized as a cursory examination.
According to the Court, Missouri's contribution restrictions did not have any
dramatically adverse effects on the funding of campaigns because the candidates
were still able to "amass impressive campaign war chests."2"' Surprisingly, the
district court's evidence, accepted by the Shrink Court as enough to substantiate
Missouri's interest in limiting contributions, included an editorial claiming that
campaign war chests tainted the democratic process2 " Another article cited by the
Court correctly noted that total campaign contributions would decline once the limits
went into effect."' After the limits were imposed, total combined spending for five
statewide offices was cut by more than half, falling from $21,599,000 to
$9,337,000.217 Total expenditures on statewide primary elections were slashed
89%.21s
In an attempt to show that contribution limits have a negligible impact on
political speech and association, the petitioners also produced evidence showing that
more than 97% of all contributors to 1994 candidates for Missouri's State Auditor
post made contributions of $2000 or less.2 9 As Justice Thomas's dissent points
out, this anecdotal information does not provide any assurance that resources
supporting political speech in Missouri have not been reduced.' If large
212. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
213. Id. at 839-40 nn.36-38.
214. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 396.
215. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 n.7 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
216. Jo Mannies, Auditor Race May Get Too Noisy to Be Ignored, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Sept.
11, 1994, at 4B.
217. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 426 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218. ld
219. d at 396.




contributions actually provide little assistance to a candidate's efforts, then why
would a candidate engage in corrupt activities in order to receive that support? And
if the restrictions "do significantly reduce campaign speech - then the majority's
calm assurance that political speech remains unaffected collapses.""'  This
evidence fails to demonstrate that a regime of large individual financial contribu-
tions capable of creating the appearance of corruption existed in Missouri, unless
the Court considers less than 2.5% of all contributions in that race a suspect regime.
Moreover, the respondents' $2000 evidentiary sample is nearly twice the amount of
the $1075 limit in question - hardly providing convincing evidence of closely
drawn limitations. In light of the Court's acceptance of such inane evidence that the
limits were closely drawn, it appears that a state would have to virtually eliminate
contributions before the Court would consider the restrictions so restraining as to
force the Court to elaborate a constitutional guideline for creating acceptable limits
in the future.
VI. Conclusion
While self-proclaimed campaign finance reformers may believe that too much
money is spent on political campaigns and that special interest groups have too
much influence on modem politics, the Supreme Court has found that the only
sufficiently important interest for restricting campaign contributions is corruption or
its appearance. Unfortunately, with the approval of Missouri's restrictions, it seems
the Court will allow a state to affect candidates' and contributors' constitutionally
protected rights of political speech and association based on insufficient reasons
masked in a cloak of unsubstantiated corruption and unreasonable claims of
perceived corruption. The First Amendment's premier priority is the protection of
political speech and association. Public officials should consider proposed
legislation affecting these freedoms with a heightened sensitivity to that constitution-
al priority. The temptation may be great to minimize these freedoms under the
pressure of a constituency that might be unhappy with a campaign system it
believes consumes too much money, but officials must first protect the critical
foundation of the First Amendment. The strength of our democracy, which is
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